Naypyidaw's dirty little tricks at "peace building"

Source Dr.zarni blog, 22 Nov

 

I often hear experts and peace-brokers, local and international, as well as 'donors' talk optimistically - and sometimes excitedly - about the Burmese regime's ceasefire deals and peace-making processes.

They often delude themselves into thinking that the generals need technical advice (often touted formula of DDR - Disarmament, De-mobilization, and Re-integration), financial assistance, political support, encouragement and you get the drift.  

Well-trained in psch-war ops, these 'peace-makers' from Naypyidaw know how to stroke your ego, entice you with things that you lust after, or simply abuse and manipulate your genuine desire to help end Burma's nasty civil wars of 60 plus year.  

Even if we naively and incorrectly assume that peace builders and support groups are high-minded and lack any hidden personal, organizational or national agendas expertly and 'donorly' involvement doesn't have much potentials to bring peace dividends in the current set up.  

The verifiable fact in the Burmese context is that the the generals and ex-generals don't embrace peace either intrinsically worthwhile goal in and of itself or as a corporate value.  They feel they can impose on resistance groups 'peace' on their own terms. 

The generals are only managing conflicts strategically and tactically for their own strategic goals of domination and eventual annihilation of any resistance groups, armed or non-violent and of control of land, above and under-ground resources, trade and strategic routes.  

On one hand, Naypyidaw's smooth-talking, but essentially dishonest and highly corrupted ex-intelligence officers like Aung Min, President Thein Sein's peace minister, talk peace, push for snap ceasefire deals and pose for the media - for propaganda's sake.

On the other hand, their men in General Staff and Special Operations Bureau - the bad cop -- are expanding and reinforcing their front line positions.  Further, the Naypyidaw's Army is emptying, as a matter of strategy, Kachin land of non-combatant communities, thereby creating a major burden and pressure on the Kachin fighters in the form of 100,000 Kachin war refugees, who need to be housed, fed and protected.  

That obviously brings down the number of Kachin troops that can engage in actual battles with the advancing Naypyidaw troops.

So, Naypyidaw troops forcing the Kachin communities to flee to KIA's command centers is part of Naypyidaw's nasty strategy towards these communities who supported voluntarily the founding of the Union of Burma as a post-colonial country and defended the Union in the fragile and early days of Burma's independence when the ethnically Burmese Troops were incapable of defending the Union from the Communists and later the Karen military assaults.